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In this paper we use an endogeneous-growth model with human capital
and heterogeneous agents to analyse the relationship between ﬁscal fed-
eralism and economic growth. Results show that federalism, which allows
education-related public good levels to be tailored on the human capital of
heterogeneous agents, increases human capital accumulation. This in turn
leads to higher rates of growth. The beneﬁts of federalism are stronger
the larger the intra-jurisdiction variance of agents’ human capital.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
More than forty years have passed since economists formally addressed the the-
ory of ﬁscal federalism. Richard Musgrave, in 1959, gave a deﬁnition of ﬁscal
federalism as a system whose purpose ”is to permit diﬀerent groups living in var-
ious states to express diﬀerent preferences for public services; and this inevitably
leads to diﬀerences in the levels of taxation and public services” (Musgrave,
1959, p. 179). So, what this means is that the more heterogeneous the federal
population, the higher the necessity of decentralization. This argument was
underpinned in the seminal works of Tiebout (1956), Olson (1969) and Oates
(1972). As Brueckner (2006, p. 2107) points out: the "beneﬁcial outcome
(of federalism)...is achieved via sorting individuals into demand-homogeneous
jurisdictions, each of which provides a diﬀerent amount of the public good".
Following these seminal studies, in the theoretical literature we have seen a
huge amount of papers (for a survey see Oates, 1999) which conﬁrm this ﬁrst
insight that is: with varying tastes and incomes of all citizens in a country,
public and uniform provision - as opposed to private provision - may result in
a loss of welfare as the distance between the deciders and beneﬁciaries of the
public goods increases.
More recently, economists are also exploring this strong argument in favour
of federalism within a dynamic setting. In other words economists are now
trying to explain the link between ﬁscal decentralization and economic growth
by developing endogenous growth models (see Koethenbuerger and Lockwood
2007). It is also worth saying that as far as the decentralization-growth nexus
is concerned, the empirical research has been more intense than the theoretical
one and, most important, robust evidence of decentralization and growth has
been found (see Thiessen 2003).
In this paper we intend to make a contribution on the theoretical side to
explore further this link and we start from an endogenous-growth model with
overlapping generations. In our model agents invest in human capital while
y o u n gt oe n h a n c et h e i re a r n i n gp o w e rw h e nt h e ya r eo l d .
Our paper is related to a model recently published by Brueckner (2006)
who shows that federalism, which allows public good levels to be tailored to
suit the diﬀerent demands of young and old individuals, who live in diﬀerent
jurisdictions, increases the incentive to save. This strong incentive in turn leads
to an increase in investment in human capital, and a by-product of this higher
investment economic growth is faster .
We modify Brueckner’s analysis since in our model we assume that i) the
public good enhances the human capital; ii) human capital is heterogeneously
distributed across individuals. In other words, diﬀerently from Brueckner’s
analysis, we consider a publicly provided public good which is related to the
educational process or investment in human capital. For instance let us think
of such public good as training programmes which may be chosen by govern-
ments to improve the educational process in the economy or stated diﬀerently
the human capital of a country.
Secondly, in Brueckner, heterogeneity across individuals - and therefore
2across jurisdictions - is only age-related. The young and the old live in sep-
arate jurisdictions and therefore there are only two jurisdictions. This sorting
assumption is crucial for the results in Brueckner’s paper.
In our work instead agents are completely heterogeneous to one another ac-
c o r d i n gt ot h ed i ﬀerent endowment of human capital they may have. So, to
the best of our knowledge, our paper is the only one that studies the relation-
ship between ﬁscal federalism and growth in a set-up where there is complete
heterogeneity among all individuals in the economy and notably our results are
independent on any sorting assumption.
Preliminary results of our analysis show that federalism, which allows ed-
ucation - related public good levels to be tailored on the human capital of
heterogeneous agents, increases human capital accumulation. This in turn leads
to higher rates of growth. The beneﬁts of federalism are stronger the larger the
intra-jurisdiction variance of agents’ human capital.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section
3 describes an idealized economy which is composed of a complete array of
heterogenous jurisdictions. Sections 4 and 5 present respectively the unitary
and the federalist system. Section 5 concludes.
2 The set-up
We set up a model that relies on Brueckner (2006), modiﬁed in order to explicitly
consider an education-related public good.
The economy consists of overlapping generation (OLG) of a continuum of
two-period lived agents with mass equal to 1. There is no population growth.
In the economy there exists a unique non-perishable good, the output good
(Y ). At any time the output good can be consumed (X),o rp u r c h a s e db yt h e
Government. The Government then uses these purchases to provide public good
(or services) (Z) to individuals.
At any time t, the following equation holds:
Yt = Xt + Zt (1)
In this economy there exists a unique production factor, human capital (H),
which is heterogeneously distributed across individuals. Ht indicates aggregate
human capital at time t. Individual variables (lowercase letters) are indexed
both by a time subscript (like the aggregate ones), and by an individual (i)
subscript and by a superscript, that indicates the agent’s generation, or date of
birth. Therefore ht
it indicates the human capital of agent i, of generation t,a t
time t. Human capital heterogeneity implies ht
it 6= ht
jt ∀i 6= j.N o t i c et h a tt h i s
hypothesis is diﬀerent from Brueckner (2006) who assumes a young representa-
tive agent and a old representative agent. In other words the young agents are
identical to one another, and the old agents also are identical to one another.
Therefore heterogeneity across individuals - and therefore across jurisdictions -
is only age-related. The young and the old live in separate jurisdictions and as
a consequence there are only two jurisdictions.
3We assume a constant marginal product, such that, the production function
becomes
Yt = F (Ht) (2)
with F0 = const
Proﬁt (F (Ht) − wtHt) maximization and the zero-proﬁt condition imply
wt = F0 (Ht) (3)
Therefore the wage rate is constant over time:
wt = w (4)
Following Brueckner (2006), we assume that young individuals fully inherit
the human capital of their "old" parents, therefore the intergenerational trans-





This hypothesis is unusual. Actually the literature that studies the intergen-
erational accumulation/transmission of human capital either assumes a genetic
mechanism, that is the young’s human capital is equal to his father’s one when
young (we could deﬁne this as a Darwinian transmission mechanism), or as-
sumes a stochastic mechanism, that is Nature extracts each generation’s human
capital from a time invariant distribution. Our hypothesis may seem Lamarkian
at ﬁrst sight, but captures the fact that parents’ human capital aﬀects the envi-
ronment where the new born lives and, by this token, aﬀect his human capital.
The public good (z) is education-related and enhances human capital of
young individuals. In other words individual human capital technology is human




where φ(0) = 1, indicating that human capital remains constant over the life
cycle if no education is undertaken, whereas on the contrary φ(zt) > 1 ∀zt > 0.
Moreover we assume diminishing returns from education, that is φ
0 (zt) > 0 and
φ
00 (zt) < 0.














1This function is identical to Yakita (2003), but for the discount rate, that we assume equal
to 0. Actually, as explained below, we assume that in the economy there exists unlimited access
to credit at an exogenous interest rate equal to 0.
4where xt
it is consumption while young and xt
it is consumption while old of the
i-th agent of generation t.
When young agents consume, pay the cost of the public good in order to
get educated, work and store inventories. Since preferences do not depend on
leisure, agents supply their entire endowment of human capital. Human capi-
tal heterogeneity across agents also implies income heterogeneity across agents,
since individual income is the product of the wage rate times individual human
capital (wht
it).
As in Brueckner (2006) we assume that the cost per-capita per unit of public
good is equal to c,w i t ht h ec o s tr e c o v e r e dv i aah e a dt a x(czt). Young agent’s
disposable income is therefore wht
it − czt. Furthermore we assume unlimited
access to credit (l) at an exogenous interest rate, that we assume, for the sake




it + lit − czt (9)
When old agents get return on human capital, work, refund the debt and
consume therefore the old agent’s budget constraint is 3:
xt
it+1 = wht
it+1 − lit (10)








Solving eq (9) for sit and substituting it into eq. (11) we get the intertem-











The interpretation of the eq. (12) is straightforward: lifetime consumption
is equal to lifetime disposable income.






subject to the IBC:
xt










The ﬁrst order conditions for a maximum are the following:
2In the model we voluntarily neglect any consideration about how the ﬁnancial markets
aﬀect growth. This hypothesis therefore allows us to get rid of any credit maket microfunda-
tion.
3If the labour income was high enough for consumption and investment in human capital
through the education-related public good, lit would be negative. This would be the case of
an economy that stores inventories, whose return is equal to 0.I ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h i si sn o t

















































In this setting the credit market allows individuals to smooth consumption
along lifetime, therefore xt∗
it = xt∗
it+1.
Notice that with this set-up, as it will be more clear in the following sec-
tions, it is possible to consider heterogeneity along two dimensions: heterogeneity
across individuals and heterogeneity across jurisdictions
3T h e a t o m i s t i c e c o n o m y
Let us assume now that the economy is like an extreme Tiebout world (one
individual in each jurisdiction). This implies zit 6= zjt for i 6= j.O b v i o u s l y
in such economy heterogeneity across individuals coincides with heterogeneity
across jurisdictions.
We index the public good with the subscript i,s i n c ei ne a c hi-th jurisdiction,
the public good is tailored to solve the i-th agent’s optimization problem.
Therefore, as far as each i-th jurisdiction is concerned, the atomistic solutions





























The Government/agent of the atomistic jurisdiction therefore chooses to


























4The superscript A stands for "atomistic".
6The ﬁrst order condition for a maximum gives the optimal level of public









From eq. (22) it is clear that the provision of public good is optimal when
the per-capita marginal cost (c) of education equals the marginal gain from










. Moreover, since the marginal return on education in-
creases as the young agents’ human capital (ht
it) increases, the optimal level
of public good is increasing and convex in ht
it
5. This is summarized in the
proposition that follows.
Proposition 1 The higher the level of human capital in a jurisdiction, the
higher the provision of the education-related public good tailored to suite the
preferences of i-th individual’s, who constitutes the jurisdiction itself.
This is basically the engine of a virtuous circle that, as shown in the following
section and summarized in propositions 2 and 3, makes a jurisdiction growing
at an increasing rate and, by the same token, allows a jurisdiction with a higher
level of human capital to grow faster than another jurisdiction with less human
capital
3.1 Dynamics
In order to study the dynamics in the atomistic economy, let us ﬁrst focus on
ﬁgure 1. Panel (a) describes equation (22), that is the atomistic optimal level of
public good, increasing and convex in ht
it. Panel (b) only transfers zA
it from the
vertical to the horizontal axes. Both panel (c) and the straight lines in panel







































































































Figure 1: The increasing returns on human capital thanks to the provision of
the education-related public good
ht
it+1 is linearly increasing in ht
it (given zA
it) (see the increasing straight lines
in panels (d)), and is increasing and concave in zA
it (given ht
it ). This means that
human capital technology enhances/multiplies the young’s human capital and
there are decreasing returns in education. Once the public good is optimally
chosen, the resulting relation between ht
it+1 and ht
it becomes increasing and
convex: the higher ht
it, the higher the public good, the higher ht
it+1.










Note that this is both the individual lifetime accumulation of human capital
and the intergenerational accumulation of human capital (remind the intergen-
erational transmission mechanism h
t+1
it+1 = ht
it+1). Therefore eq. (24) describes
also the dynamics of the human capital of the i-th jurisdiction, as shown in the

















Figure 2: The phase diagram for an atomistic jurisdiction
9Proposition 2 An atomistic jurisdiction grows at an increasing rate.















Therefore during the human capital accumulation process, the rate of growth
increases. The rationale for this result comes from proposition 1.
Proposition 3 The higher the level of human capital in a jurisdiction, the
higher the rate of growth performed by the jurisdiction itself.










it if and only if ht
jt >h t
it
3.2 The economy: aggregating atomistic jurisdictions
Let us pass now to analyze the performance of the entire economy, which consists
of the aggregation of all the atomistic jurisdictions. First of all, notice that, since
each generation has mass equal to 1, aggregate and average levels of variables








the average human capital
of generation t while old (or equivalently of generation t +1while young), and
by h
t
t the average human capital of generation t while young. Taking the mean

















Proposition 4 The aggregate dynamics of an atomistic economy is positively
aﬀected both by the average human capital and by the variance of the distribution
of human capital.
The rationale for the relevance of the variance is based on the increasing
returns on human capital thanks to the provision of the education-related public
good and on the deriving convexity of the phase diagram. To have a graphic
intuition of this result let us analyze the following ﬁgure. The ﬁgure represents
two economies with the same mean and two agents/jurisdictions each but with
diﬀerent variance of human capital. One economy has a higher variance than the






is higher for the atomistic
economy with a higher variance.
Proposition 5 T h er a t eo fg r o w t ho fa na t o m i s t i ce c o n o m yi sh i g h e rt h eh i g h e r














Figure 3: The eﬀects of the variance in the aggregate atomistic economy

























4T h e U n i t a r y S y s t e m
If the economy is a unitary system, at any time t a common public good level
zt is provides regardless the heterogeneity across agents. Therefore zit = zt for
any i.T h el e v e lo fzt is chosen according to the average of the preferences across
agents, therefore taking the mean of all zA

























Proposition 6 The Government of a unitary economy would supply a level of
public good that increases both in the ﬁrst and in the second moment of the
distribution of human capital.




Proof. This would be the case of a representative agent economy with absence
of heterogeneity.
Proposition 8 In a unitary economy the provision of the education-related pub-



























Proof. The proof follows by comparing eq. 22 with eq. 28.
4.1 Dynamics
Substituting eq. 28 into eq. 7, we get the individual law of motion of human


















Proposition 9 In a unitary economy the accumulation of individual human




























12Proof. The proof follows from proposition 8.










































First of all notice that the increasing marginal returns on human capital dis-
appears, since the provision of public good is not tailored on individual human
capital.
Proposition 10 The atomistic economy accumulates more human capital and
grows at a faster rate than the unitary economy.

















5 The Federalist System
Let us consider now the federalist system. For the sake of simplicity let us
assume that the economy is composed by two jurisdictions Ω and Γ.N o t i c e
that this sorting assumption is very general. In other words, we do not consider
a rich versus a poor jurisdiction as an assumption.
In each jurisdiction at any time t a common public good level zt. Therefore
zit = zΩ
t for any i ∈ Ω and zit = zΓ
t for any i ∈ Γ.T h e l e v e l o f zt is chosen
according to the average of the preferences across agents, therefore taking the


































Proposition 11 The Federalist Government would supply a level of public good
that increases both in the ﬁrst and in the second moment of the distribution of







Figure 4: Intra and inter jurisdiction heterogeneity
Notice that the literature on ﬁscal federalism typically analyzes heterogeneity
only along one dimension -that is inter-jurisdictions heterogeneity - in other
words a rich versus a poor jurisdiction. Since in our model there exists complete
heterogeneity across agents, this implies that exists heterogeneity even inside
each jurisdiction (Ω and Γ),t h a tw ec a l lintra-jurisdiction heterogeneity. This
is captured by Va r Ω (ht
it) and Va r Γ (ht
it).
To sum up, the two dimensions heterogeneity can be sketched by the follow-
ing ﬁgure.
5.1 Dynamics





























































































































as far as jurisdiction Γ is concerned.
Proposition 12 Each jurisdiction J beneﬁts from federalism as long as





















This proposition tells us that the beneﬁts from federalism are independent on
any sorting assumption of individuals into jurisdictions. Moreover the beneﬁts
are larger the larger the variance in agents’ endowment of human capital.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We have developed a theoretical model in order to explore the relationship
between federalism and economic growth. The model is an endogenous-growth
model with overlapping generations of two-period lived, heterogeneous agents.
To sum up, building on Brueckner’s work (2006) in our paper we have ex-
plicitly considered an education-related public good that enhances individual
human capital; moreover we have considered complete heterogeneity among all
the agents living in this economy. Therefore, it is worth of note that this set-up
allowed us to study the eﬀects of heterogeneity which is then twofold: inter-
jurisdictions and intra-jurisdiction.
Intra-jurisdiction heterogeneity is proxied by the variance of the intra- ju-
risdiction distribution of human capital. The provision of an education-related
public good, both in the unitary and in the federalist system, is tailored to suit
15the characteristics of the distribution of human capital respectively within the
economy as a whole and within each jurisdiction. More precisely the provision
of the public good in the federalist system (unitary system) increases as the
intra- jurisdiction (economywide) ﬁrst and second moments of the distribution
of human capital increase. For a given level of the average human capital, the
higher the intra-jurisdiction (economywide) heterogeneity, the higher the provi-
sion of the education-related public good, and the higher the accumulation of
human capital. This virtuous circle boosts economic growth.
Preliminary results of our analysis also show that, for a given level of the
average human capital in the jurisdiction and in the economy, the beneﬁts of
federalism are stronger the larger the intra-jurisdiction heterogeneity with re-
spect to the economywide heterogeneity. Notably our results are independent
on any sorting assumption.
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